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Will the Digital Markets Act Kill Innovation in Europe? 
 
By Pierre Larouche* & Alexandre de Streel+ 
 
2 
In December 2020, the European Commission 
proposed an ambitious new set of rules, the 
Digital Markets Act (“DMA”),1 which could be 
applicable in 2023 and whose rationale leans 
heavily on innovation. In many places 
throughout the proposed DMA recitals, the 
Explanatory Memorandum included therewith 
and the Impact Assessment attached thereto, 
the Commission explains in greater detail how 
innovation is currently adversely impacted in 
the digital economy and how its proposal 
would improve the situation.2 
 
General Relationship Between Competition 
and Innovation  
At a general level, the Commission reiterates 
its core belief that there is a direct relationship 
between competition and innovation: more 
competition leads to more innovation.3 Similar 
statements are found throughout the decisions 
and soft-law instruments issued by competition 
agencies across Europe. One might fault the 
Commission for taking what looks like a strong 
Arrowian view4 of the relationship between 
competition and innovation, ignoring both the 
Schumpeterian analysis5 (which posits an 
inverse relationship) and the contemporary 
synthesis (which returns an inverted-U 
relationship) made by a cluster of authors 
around Aghion.6 In the context of competition 
law, authorities are usually dealing with 
markets where competition is rather 
diminished than excessive. It may then not 
matter much in practice whether they take an 
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1 Proposal of the Commission of 15 December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable 
and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842. For a description and an analysis of the Commission 
proposal, see A. de Streel & P. Larouche, The European Digital Markets Act proposal: How to improve a regulatory revolution, 
Concurrences, 2021/2, 43. 
2 Impact Assessment Report of the Commission Services on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), SWD(2020) 363. 
3 DMA Impact Assessment, para.279. 
4 Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in R. Nelson, The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activities: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton University Press, 1962. 
5 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. 
6 Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith & P. Howitt, “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship,” 120 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 2005, 701. 
Arrow or Aghion theoretical perspective, since 
in all likelihood authorities are active on the 
upward-sloping part of the inverted-U, where 
Arrow and Aghion coincide.  
While the DMA may also play out in the 
upward-sloping part of the inverted-U, it cannot 
be excluded that in some situations, 
competition is already strong, so that 
authorities could be acting on the downward-
sloping part of the inverted-U, where it is no 
longer correct to assume that more 
competition will unavoidably foster innovation. 
Indeed, in the more elaborate parts of its 
analysis, the Commission shows that it is 
aware that the relationship between 
competition and innovation is not so simple. 
There are some trade-offs involved, especially 
once the specific features of so-called Core 
Platform Services, i.e. the digital services 
targeted by the DMA, are brought into the 
picture, namely: economies of scale and 
scope, network effects (compounded by multi-
sidedness), lock-in, lack of multi-homing, 
vertical integration and data-driven 
advantages. Innovation can come from the 
platform itself – and the firm controlling it (the 
“gatekeeper” pursuant to the DMA) – or it can 
arise around the platform, typically driven by a 
firm using the platform to bring an invention to 
the market (a “user” pursuant to the DMA). The 
Commission is well aware that the DMA could 
reduce the innovation incentives of the 
platform owner; the question then becomes 
what is gained in return. Once the analysis 
reaches that level of sophistication, however, it 
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starts branching out in different directions. As 
the following paragraphs show, two distinct 
innovation scenarios are bundled together in 
the DMA. 
 
Scenario 1: Sustaining Innovation by Users 
Based on the Core Platform Services 
As a starting point, the Commission 
recognizes that online platforms have proven 
to be innovation hotbeds, with innovation 
originating throughout the platform ecosystem, 
i.e. not just from the gatekeepers themselves, 
but also from platform users, businesses and 
individuals alike.7 Platform users innovate by 
introducing complementary products, for 
instance games or productivity apps for mobile 
operating systems. Yet the heady early days of 
the Internet are over. In the current context, the 
Commission points to evidence that the rise of 
powerful gatekeepers controlling the main 
online platforms leads to sub-optimal levels of 
innovation. Essentially, the innovation 
incentives of the gatekeepers and the users 
become misaligned, and the gatekeepers start 
to divert some of their efforts towards 
preventing or appropriating innovations 
brought about by platform users. In that case, 
certain courses of conduct by platform 
operators hinder business users and adversely 
affect their innovation incentives. Ultimately, 
these businesses refrain or are prevented from 
bringing innovative offerings to the market.  
Under this scenario, the main concern is that 
the platform gatekeeper would go out of its 
way to control the flow of innovation around its 
platform. While blocking inventive offerings by 
users is certainly possible, a more likely course 
of conduct, witnessed in a number of cases 
already (from Microsoft to Google Shopping 
 
7 Jacobides, Cennamo & Gawer, “Towards a theory of Ecosystems,” Strategic Management Journal, 2018, 2255; Cennamo & 
Santaló, “Generativity tension and value creation in platform ecosystems,” Organization Science, 2019, 447. 
8 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, Case 37 792 Microsoft confirmed in appeal by the General Court in Case T-201/04, 
Microsoft v. Commission, EU:T:2007:289. Commission Decision of 16 December 2009, Case 39 530 Microsoft (Explorer); 
Commission Decision of 27 June 2017, Case 39 740 Google Search (Shopping); Commission Decision of 18 July 2018, Case 40 
099 Google Android. 
9 DMA Proposal, art.6.1(a), 6.1(b), 6.1(f). 
10 DMA Proposal, art.5(e) covers identification services, art.5(f), 6.1(b), 6.1(c), 6.1(e) extend to apps and app stores, and the 
definition of “ancillary service” at art.2.14 expressly includes payment services. 
and Google Android),8 is that the gatekeeper 
would use bundling or self-preferencing to 
exclude the inventive user and appropriate the 
profits from the innovation via a competing 
offering of its own. A significant proportion of 
the obligations contained in the DMA are 
designed to address that concern. They 
include generic prohibitions against the use of 
non-public data to compete with business 
users or self-preferencing in search rankings, 
as well as an obligation to grant equal access 
to APIs and other interoperability features.9 In 
addition, the DMA proposal protects more 
specifically some neighbouring markets 
against gatekeeper conduct, namely 
identification services, apps and app stores 
and payment services.10  
As far as innovation theory is concerned, this 
scenario involves what would typically be 
incremental innovation around the existing 
core platform service (as with the Novell and 
Sun server operating systems in relation to 
Windows Server Operating System in 
Microsoft). Furthermore, that innovation will 
also be sustaining innovation as it will remain 
within the value network or the architecture 
created by the platform. For instance, it would 
consist of apps running on a smartphone 
operating system platform such as iOS or 
Android; a specialized search engine (or 
another ancillary service such as maps, etc.) 
accessible through a general search engine 
such as Google; or a retail business hosted on 
an online retailing platform such as Amazon. 
As a normative matter, the Commission cannot 
be faulted for intervening to safeguard the 
ability of third parties to carry out incremental 
innovation around the core platform services. 
Incremental innovation is especially prevalent 
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in the digital economy, and it can greatly 
contribute to consumer welfare. Starting with 
Microsoft, competition enforcement in the EU 
has protected incremental innovation in the 
digital economy, although this has never been 
explicitly stated. 11 In that respect, the DMA 
proposal merely extends the innovation policy 
choices made in competition law enforcement.  
Whereas the first scenario is laid out in the 
Commission Impact Assessment and 
translated in the list of obligations and 
prohibitions applicable to gatekeepers, it does 
not entirely fit within either the “contestability” 
or “fairness” objectives defined in the DMA 
proposal. Regarding fairness, the proposal 
indicates that it should be understood as a 
contractual imbalance between the respective 
rights and obligations of gatekeeper and 
user.12 This definition does not fil well with the 
first innovation scenario which is more about 
equality of competitive opportunity.13 As for 
contestability, the DMA proposal almost 
always defines it in relation to core platform 
services, in line with economic theory where 
contestability is a redeeming feature of 
monopolistic markets.14 However, the first 
innovation scenario, as regards both the 
analysis and the remedial obligations, has little 
to do with the contestability of core platform 
services: rather, it is about containing 
gatekeeper power and preventing it from 
adversely affecting neighbouring markets in 





11 Larouche, “The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and Innovation,” 75 Antitrust Law Journal, 
2009, 933. 
12 DMA Proposal, art.10(2a). 
13 Equality of competitive opportunity seeped from Article 106(1) TFEU case-law into Article 102 TFEU analysis, in the wake of 
Cases C-280/08P, Deutsche Telekom EU:C:2010:603. 
14 Baumol, Panzar & Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, Saunders College Publishing/Harcourt 
Brace, 1982. 
15 DMA Impact Assessment, para. 280, 282-3, 322; also Rec. 17 of the proposal. 
16 Larouche, Platforms, “Innovation and Competition on the market,” CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February 2020; Petit, Big Tech and the 
Digital Economy: The Moligopoly Scenario, Oxford University Press, 2020. 
17 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007; Gans, The Disruption Dilemma, MIT 
Press, 2016. 
Scenario 2: Innovation in the Core Platform 
Services: Frontal Competition or 
Disruption?  
When it comes to contestability on the core 
platform services, the DMA proposal does not 
clearly explain the link with innovation. The 
Impact Assessment mentions that the 
gatekeepers divert their resources away from 
R&D and towards M&A, in order to compete 
“for the market.” At the same time, it is known 
that “a significant amount of innovation is 
driven by disruptive firms,” so that the DMA 
proposal should seek “to protect the 
competitive process by which disruptive firms 
challenge the status quo.”15 These passages 
hint at disruptive innovation, but do not fully 
develop the analysis. For one, the Commission 
misunderstands disruptive innovation by 
linking it with competition “for the market.” In 
the case of gatekeepers within the meaning of 
the DMA, competition for the market would be 
very difficult to achieve, since gatekeepers 
have fully exploited the characteristics of core 
platform services to build a quasi-unassailable 
position. There is little hope for a new search 
engine to outperform Google, for a competing 
social network to oust Facebook or for an 
alternative online commerce and retail 
platform to outcompete Amazon.  
The more likely scenario is not frontal 
competition, but rather sideways competition, 
where a core platform service is side-lined and 
made less central for users (competition “on 
the market”).16 Such sideways competition 
usually involves disruptive innovation in the 
technical sense – as introduced by 
Christensen and then updated by Gans17 – 
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namely an innovation where the incumbent 
firm is caught off-guard and punished despite 
doing what made it successful. Disruptions are 
never frontal assaults: they involve a shift in 
the value network binding consumers to a 
given product space, or in the dominant 
architecture used by suppliers on that space. 
We witnessed a number of disruptions in the 
digital economy in recent years, usually with 
positive implications for competition policy. So 
it is that Google heralded the rise of Internet-
centric computing, which turned client 
operating systems (such as Windows) into a 
sideshow. Then Facebook turned a social 
media platform into an alternative portal to 
search engines such as Google, limiting the 
impact of Google’s dominance. The rise of 
smartphones – led by the iPhone – not only 
reshuffled the market for mobile devices but 
also made computers less central, thereby 
reducing the impact of dominant positions in 
CPUs, for instance.  
If disruptive innovation does not involve frontal 
competition and blindsides incumbents, can 
these incumbents do anything to avert it? 
Possible defensive strategies include trying to 
prevent potential disruptors (to the extent they 
can be detected) from gaining a foothold – as 
Microsoft did when it saw the threat emerging 
from Netscape in the 1990s – or acquiring 
potentially threatening firms to throttle any 
disruption.18  
By now it has become clear that the 
Facebook/Instagram and 
Facebook/WhatsApp acquisitions were 
textbook cases of the latter strategy, as the 
recent US state-level and FTC antitrust case 
against Facebook indicate.19 The DMA 
proposal picks up on strategic acquisitions with 
 
18 Federico, Scott Morton & Shapiro, “Antitrust and innovation: Welcoming and protecting disruptions,” in J. Lerner & S. Stern (eds), 
Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2019, 125. 
19 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization Also, Argentesi., Buccirossi, 
Calvano, Duso, Marrazzo & Nava “Merger Policy in Digital Markets: An Ex-Post Assessment,” CESifo Working Paper No. 7985, 
2019. 
20 DMA Proposal, art.12 
21 Commission Guidance of 26 March 2021 on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger 
Regulation to certain categories of cases, O.J. [2021] C 113/1. 
22 Resp. DMA Proposal, art.5(g) and 6.1(g), art.6.1(h), art.5(b), art.5(c), art.6.1(j). 
23 Resp. DMA Proposal, art.6.1(h), art.6.1(i). 
its obligation to inform the Commission about 
intended concentrations but it is a relatively 
weak provision.20 In combination with the new 
Guidance on Case Referrals to the 
Commission,21 it could become a clever 
workaround to the notification thresholds. 
However, even if the Commission could 
eventually review these strategic acquisitions, 
they remain a blind spot in the current merger 
control law. Many questions remain 
unaddressed, such as which theory of harm 
would justify blocking such acquisitions, and 
which standard of proof should apply (balance 
of probabilities or balance of harms).  
As for the defensive exclusionary strategy, 
even if the disruption analysis is not developed 
in the DMA, some of the obligations could help 
to keep gatekeepers vulnerable to disruption: 
they include the obligation to keep advertising 
markets transparent, to provide data to users 
and to allow for data portability, to refrain from 
MFN clauses and steering and to offer access 
to search engine data to third-party search 
engine.22 It is apparent from the rationale and 
the wording of these obligations that they are 
meant to support frontal competition with the 
core platform service in question. Yet these 
obligations can also provide cover for a 
disrupting innovator to come close enough to 
the gatekeeper, so that the disruptor can use 
its position as a stepping stone to shift the 
value network or the dominant architecture.  
By way of illustration, the obligations relating to 
data portability, or to the availability of data 
generated by and through the activities of 
business users,23 could be used to enable a 
frontal competitor to Google, Facebook or 
Amazon – however unlikely – to survive by 
feeding on the data obtained from such 
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gatekeepers via its users. But these 
obligations – depending on how they are 
specified in practice – could also be used to 
funnel data to an innovative entrant that would 
try to disrupt the value network or the dominant 
architecture: hypothetically, business users 
may for instance transfer the data they 
obtained from Amazon to a provider of a 
platform dedicated to second-hand sales and 
trades, local sourcing or ethical sourcing, that 
could disrupt online retail if successful. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be 
added that disruption could also conceivably 
come from an innovator in a complementary 
product around a core platform service 
(Scenario 1), where this product would evolve 
from a mere complement into a disruptive 
offering. Such was the case, for instance, for 
Netscape’s original web browser, which 
started as a complement to an operating 
system such as Windows (enabling it to open 
up to the World Wide Web). Later it became an 
existential disruptive threat, triggering an anti-
competitive reaction from Microsoft in order to 
protect its position. The obligations that 
surround Scenario 1 can therefore protect not 
just sustaining innovation on a core platform 
service, but also open up a path to disruption. 
 
DMA and Innovation 
Putting it all together, the DMA would be meant 
to affect innovation as follows. First, it seeks to 
preserve the innovation incentives of the users 
of core platform services, so that they can 
deliver innovative offerings of the incremental 
type, by way of complementary products within 
the platform ecosystem and thus of sustaining 
innovation (Scenario 1 above). Second, as far 
as the contestability of core platform services 
is concerned, the DMA proposal seems 
focused on enabling frontal competition with 
the gatekeepers (Scenario 2 above). It is 
questionable whether this is a realistic 
perspective, and how significant an innovation 
this would generate. Third, it could be argued 
that, in trying to safeguard innovation 
Scenarios 1 and 2, the DMA proposal is also 
opening some paths for inventive rivals to 
attempt disruption, either by starting from a 
complementary offering or by staking a market 
position close to the gatekeeper and using it as 
a springboard. 
Thus, the DMA proposal leaves as many paths 
open as possible to innovative firms. This may 
be the best policy choice given the inherent 
unpredictability of innovation.24 Fairness 
(defined as equality of opportunity) and 
contestability (defined as reducing entry 
barriers on and around core platform services) 
would then be shorthand for a regulatory 
objective of keeping markets open and 
competitive as much as possible. Seen from 
that angle, the DMA would fit within a 
revamped version of the ordo-liberal tradition 
that still underpins much of EU competition law 
and economic regulation.25 This ordo-
liberalism for the 21st century would have 
dynamism and innovation at its core, as the 
main reason why markets should be kept open 
and competitive. 26 Seen from that angle, the 
DMA will not kill but rather promote the 




24 Kerber, Competition, Innovation, and Competition Law: Dissecting the Interplay, 2017, available on SSRN. 
25 Eucken, The Foundations of Economics: History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality, Springer, 1992; Gerber, Law 
and Competition in the Twentieth Century Europe, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
26 de Streel, Should Digital Antitrust be Ordo-liberal?, Concurrences, 1-2020, 2. 
